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Abstract  
This paper focuses on social perception, an area of research that lies at the interface 
between the philosophy of perception and the scientific investigation of human social 
cognition. Some philosophers and psychologists appeal to resonance mechanisms to 
show that intentional and goal-directed actions can be perceived. Against these 
approaches, I show that there is a class of simple goal-directed actions, whose perception 
does not rely on resonance. I discuss the role of the STS (superior temporal sulcus) as the 
possible neural correlate of perception of goal-directed actions. My proposal is 
intermediate between claims according to which we perceive intentional actions and 
claims according to which we cannot perceive goal-directed actions. 
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1. PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The topic of this paper lies at the interface between the philosophy of perception and the 
scientific investigation of human social cognition, the study of how we apprehend (that 
is, perceive or understand) other people. In recent cognitive science, the term ‘social 
perception’ has come to refer to the initial visual stages of processing of information 
relevant to human social cognition (Allison, Puce and McCarthy [2000]). Much 
experimental work in social perception focuses on the existence of brain mechanisms 
dedicated to the perception of human bodies and human faces, and to the initial stages of 
processing of socially relevant information.   
In this paper, I focus on one potential case of social perception and its relation to social 
understanding: perception of goal-directed actions. This topic is also relevant to broader 
concerns in philosophy of perception about the reach of perceptual content (Hawley and 
Macpherson [2011]). While it is widely agreed that we can see the shape, size, 
orientation, color, ... of objects, it is a matter of debate whether we can also see, and not 
merely cognize or conceptually represent, higher-level and complex properties, such as 
causation, being a pine tree, or being a forest (Hawley and Macpherson [2011]). In the 
context of social perception, while it is uncontroversial that we can see others’ bodily 
parts and movements, I want to argue that the high-level, complex property of being a 
goal-directed action can be represented in perception, and not merely cognized or 
conceptually represented. In other words, we can see goal-directedness.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I introduce some central notions, outline 
the issues at the core of the paper, and clarify its methodology. In section 2, I consider 
and criticize the view according to which the perception of goal-directed actions rests on 
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resonance. These criticisms help to make room for the introduction of my positive view, 
which I present in section 3. There I provide some empirical evidence which shows that 
there is social perception of goal-directed actions in the absence of resonance. This 
evidence comes from different sources: studies devoted to the neural circuits underlying 
the perception of goal-directed actions and psychophysical studies in adults. In section 4 I 
tentatively connect the discussion of the neural correlates of goal-directed action 
perception with perceptual experience of goal-directed actions. In section 5, I further 
flesh out this thesis, by exploring a hypothesis about the developmental trajectory of our 
capacity to visually perceive actions.  
Before launching into the main argument of this paper, I need to make two terminological 
clarifications. First, I distinguish different meanings of ‘goal’. Second, I clarify my use of 
the term ‘goal-directed action’, which is based on the way this notion is employed in the 
empirical literature.  
When talking about goals, we can use the term in at least two ways. ‘Goal’ can be used to 
refer to complex mental states involving long term plans and aimed at fulfilling one’s 
aims, embedded in a net of related psychological states (for example when we say: 'Her 
goal is to become the next CEO.'). On this reading, goals cannot be perceived because 
they are private psychological states of the agent and are deeply interwoven in a complex 
web of intentions, beliefs, and desires in the mind of the agent who has the goal.  
In the case of visible goal-directed actions, ‘goal’ can be used in a simpler, deflationary 
way, to indicate the outcome of a visible movement, whether or not the movement is 
guided by a mental state. In this external sense, goals are individuated perceptually as the 
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end-points of visible trajectories, and not via the presence of an underlying teleological 
mental state. In the psychological literature, the outcomes (goals) of actions are events, 
which can involve objects (grasping an apple, touching a doll, …), locations and objects 
(placing the cup in a certain location, …) or just locations (sprinting to some place, …). 
Henceforth, unless otherwise specified, I use 'goal’ in this deflationary sense to mean the 
outcome of a trajectory.   
Secondly, I use the term ‘goal-directed actions’ as it is usually employed in the empirical 
literature on social cognition. By this term I mean a movement directed toward a goal, 
and not an intentional action as that notion is often used in the philosophy of action.1 In 
the sense used in this paper, a goal-directed action is an efficient motoric means whereby 
an agent achieves its outcome given the situational context, whether or not the agent 
really intended to execute the action (let alone has full-blooded mental states). In this 
cognitively less demanding sense, the agent is any entity that exhibits perceptual cues 
associated with agency: self-propelled motion, contingent movements in response to the 
environment, … (Premack [1990]). I focus on a limited class of simple goal-directed 
actions that can be analysed into their perceptual components, as comprising the visually 
presented target (goal), the spatiotemporal path to the goal, the entity moving to the goal, 
and the visually presented obstacles (if there are any).  
Nevertheless, it is controversial that even the minimal notion of goal-directed action 
                                               
1 In the philosophy of action, goal-directed actions are a case of intentional actions, defined with 
respect to the presence or absence of an underlying propositional attitude, an intention (Davidson [1963]; 
Searle [1983]). The presence of an underlying intention is what distinguishes, say, breathing, from 
switching the light on. Philosophers connect intentions to reasons, so that knowing that a person has done 




outlined above can be perceived. Indeed, it has been suggested that goal-directed actions 
can be apprehended only in cognition: ‘The motions [of a hand towards an object] could 
be characterized entirely in spatiotemporal terms—in terms of the trajectories of each 
figure relative to the others, and to those of each other. Nowhere in these descriptions 
would we find concepts such as goal.’ (Carey [2009], p. 171). The idea behind this quote 
is that in order to represent a movement as goal-directed one needs to possess and apply 
the concept GOAL. 
I will defend the contrasting view according to which there is perceptual processing of 
goal-directedness. The perception of goal-directedness would clearly a case of ‘rich’ 
perception, that is, perception of higher-level properties. Thus, the overarching question 
that motivates this paper is: What is the relation between the reach of perceptual content 
and human social cognition? In particular, can some of the properties that we are 
intuitively inclined to call ‘social’ be represented in perception? 
Bringing together the debate about the reach of perception and the debate about the 
nature of basic social cognition, I will argue that being a goal-directed action performed 
by another can indeed be represented in perception. In other words, I will argue that the 
property of an action of being an efficient means for achieving the agent’s goal can be 
encoded in the content of vision. Since most goal-directed actions which we perceive are 
performed by other human beings, and perceiving these actions plays a major role in 
shaping our social interactions, this is highly relevant to human social cognition more 
generally.   
A point of methodology: In order to extend the reach of perceptual content, it is 
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customary to start from perceptual experiences and ‘seeming states,’ which are taken to 
non-problematically encode low-level sensory properties, and try to extend the reach of 
the content of perception to higher-level properties, whose representation may seem 
prima facie to require the possession of conceptual resources, while appealing 
exclusively to introspectable phenomenological intuitions (Siegel [2010]). This strategy 
rests on the assumption that there is an introspectable difference between seeing 
something while experiencing it as an F and seeing something without experiencing it as 
an F, where F is taken to be a high-level property (such as being a pine tree).  The goal of 
the strategy is to account for the purported introspectable experiential difference by an 
inference to the best explanation. The best explanation in this case would purportedly be 
that the phenomenal contrast is due to the presence of a visual non-cognitive 
phenomenology.  
Because it rests on several assumptions, which I take to be contentious, I prefer to appeal 
to a different strategy: basing my claim on evidence about the underlying psychological 
and neural mechanisms, I argue that perception can represent goal-directed actions. I do 
not focus solely on the phenomenology of perceptual experiences2 to argue that goal-
directed actions can be perceptually represented. Instead, I appeal to empirical evidence 
from neuroscience and vision science in support of the phenomenological resources.  
There are two reasons for this choice. First, it might be that conscious content and 
perceptual content do not perfectly align (Burge [2010], pp. 34–46). Perceptual content 
can play a role in a person's cognitive life despite not being consciously accessed, for 
example by guiding on-line reactions in the absence of recognition. This might be 




particularly true of social perception, where we can react to some social features of the 
world even before recognizing that they are. The second reason is a methodological one: 
while the point about whether goal-directed actions can be represented in perception is 
mainly conceptual, it obviously bears on the interpretation of experimental data from 
social cognitive neuroscience, and psychophysical studies in adults. Therefore, I appeal to 
studies in vision science that are not always based on conscious experiences. 
2. DOES THE PERCEPTION OF GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIONS REST ON RESO-
NANCE? 
 
Some scientists and philosophers have argued that perception cannot represent goal-
directed actions on the grounds that perception can only represent low-level sensory 
properties (for example Carey [2009], p. 171). In the debate on direct social perception, 
Spaulding has argued that the claim that we can perceive others’ mental states (including 
goal-directed actions) just like we perceive ordinary objects and without the application 
of cognitive inferences is implausible (Spaulding [2015]). Drawing on Dretske’s distinc-
tion between simply seeing and epistemic seeing, she suggests that we can epistemically 
see others’ mental states. But to epistemically see that someone is happy, one has to pos-
sess concepts for mental states (such as the concept HAPPINESS) (Spaulding [2015]). Epis-
temic seeing is not a case of perceptual experience, but a case of belief, formed on the 
basis of perception: it is thus a cognitive, and not a perceptual, state.  
Recently, a competing view has gained traction among philosophers and cognitive 
scientists: they suggest that we can perceptually represent not merely goal-directed 
actions, but others’ intentions (that is others’ mental states) as well (Pacherie [2005]; 
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Proust [2003]; Gallese [2009]).3  
The claim is that we perceive intentional actions via a mechanism called ‘resonance’ 
(Knoblich [2008]; Pacherie [2005]; Proust [2003]; Gallese [2009]). Resonance is broadly 
defined as the mapping of another’s action onto one’s own motor repertoire. According to 
the resonance research program, perceptual resonant processes underlie our appraisal of 
others' observed actions (Pacherie [2005]; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia [2007]): resonant 
mechanisms are activated both when we execute an action, and when we observe an 
action performed by someone else. Resonant theories postulate that perception and action 
share a common computational code (Prinz [1990]), which means that actions are coded 
in terms of the perceivable effects they generate. These codes are available both during 
action performance in oneself and during action observation in others. 
One potential source of empirical support for such views is the discovery of mirror 
neurons (neurons active both during execution of an action and observation of an action 
performed by another), which has been widely taken to show that the very same 
resources necessary for executing goal-directed actions are sufficient for understanding 
and even perceiving the same kinds of actions performed by others (Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia [2007]). Thus, the discovery of mirror neurons4 in the primate brain has been 
                                               
3 Direct social perception approaches often claim that perception is an alternative (or additional) route to 
mindreading for understanding others (Kiverstein [2015]; Krueger [2012]). Defenders of social percep-
tion appeal both to phenomenological considerations and to empirical studies on perception to show that 
we can directly perceive some mental states without the need for a cognitive, high-level process. With 
such defenders of social perception, I share two ideas: that we can perceive some social properties, and 
that we can show this via an appeal to empirical data. Nevertheless, I disagree with most direct social 
perception approaches with respect to commitment to the enactivist and embodiment theses (on which I 
am neutral). 
4 Mirroring refers to a ‘[n]eural process N [that] is an activation of a mirror neuron or mirror system, and 
(2) […] results from observing something that is normally a behavioral or expressive manifestation (or a 
predictive sign) of a matching mirror event in another individual.’ (Goldman [2013], p. 91). A ‘mirror 
 
9 
interpreted as the discovery of a mechanism whereby the observer’s brain resonates with 
the agent’s brain: the perception of the agent’s overt action automatically causes the 
observer to covertly map the agent’s executed movements onto the observer’s motor 
repertoire without executing it (Rizzolatti et al. [2001]).  
For instance, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia write: ‘We immediately recognize a specific 
action. [The monkey] immediately perceives the meaning of these motor events and 
interprets them in terms of an intentional act’ (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia [2008], p. 9798). 
Gallese expresses a similar idea: ‘To see others’ behavior as an ‘action’ [...] specifically 
requires such behaviors to be mapped according to an isomorphic format. Such mapping 
is embodied simulation’ (Gallese [2009], p. 527). 
Pacherie writes: ‘The purpose of this paper is to examine under what conditions it makes 
sense to say that we can perceive actions performed by other agents as intentional and, 
thus, in a sense, can perceive intentions’ (Pacherie [2005], p. 2). 
I will follow resonance theorists in arguing that our access to others’ actions is perceptual 
in nature, but in contrast to resonance theory, I will argue that, while resonance plays 
some role in influencing how we perceive actions, it is not necessary to perceive goal-
directedness in the first place. Two distinct questions are raised by the claims of the 
resonance theory, both of which are controversial and rarely distinguished.  
The first question (the representational scope question) is whether resonance enables an 
                                                                                                                                            
system’ is a ‘neural system […] that gets activated both when an individual undergoes a certain mental or 
cognitive event endogenously and when he observes a sign that another individual is undergoing, or is 
about to undergo, the same type of mental or cognitive event.’ (Goldman [2013], p.91). 
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observer to represent (and understand), not merely an agent’s goal-directed action 
(whereby, for example, the agent reaches for and grasps a target), but the content of her 
intention (that is a psychological state) as well.  
The second question (the mechanisms question) is whether resonance mechanisms should 
be construed as necessary and sufficient conditions for perceiving others’ goal-directed 
actions, that is whether resonance mechanisms provide grounds for the view that one can 
perceive, not merely others’ bodily movements, but their goal-directed actions as well.    
I will quickly address the first question, which has already been extensively debated (see 
Spaulding [2013]; Jacob [2009]).5 The crux of the debate is whether the representational 
resources postulated by resonance theorists are sufficient to represent another's intention, 
beyond what is visible: according to one interpretation proposed by Spaulding, resonance 
causally (and not constitutively) contributes to understanding of goal-directed behaviors 
only (Spaulding [2013]). 
An agent’s goal-directed action (or behavior) includes several components, ranging from 
the agent’s body, her bodily movements, and their effects on the immediate environment 
surrounding the agent’s body, in particular on the target of her bodily movements, all of 
which can be perceptually tracked. Assuming the existence of resonance mechanisms in 
the observer’s brain (that is of mirror neurons or the mirror system for actions), they 
likely enable the observer to map (or match) the agent’s bodily movements onto her own 
                                               
5 The different interpretations of resonance mechanisms are: resonance is constitutive of mindreading 
(Gallese [2009]), resonance causally contributes to low-level mindreading (Goldman [2013]), resonance 
allows for the perception of intentions (Pacherie [2005]), resonance causally contributes to behavior 
reading (Spaulding [2013]), resonance is involved in processing that follows mindreading (Jacob 
[2009]), resonance is enactive social perception (Gallagher [2008]). The correct interpretation of mirror-
ing and resonance in respect to mindreading does not concern me in this paper.   
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motor repertoire, without executing them.  
The question now arises: by mapping the agent’s movements onto her motor repertoire, 
could resonance enable the observer to represent the agent’s goal? Could it enable the 
observer to represent her bodily movements as an efficient means towards achieving her 
goal? Or else, could it enable the observer to represent the agent’s intentions? If so, then 
what type of intentions would they represent? Arguably, an agent’s intentions form a 
hierarchy ranging from executive intentions to prior intentions.6 But all of an agent’s 
intentions, including executive intentions, are private mental states. To access another’s 
intention in order to use it for prediction and explanation of another’s behavior, one 
plausibly needs to go beyond overt behaviors to somehow access others' mental states. 
The question that now arises is how to bridge the gap between seeing an agent’s overt 
movements and seeing her private intentions. Resonance mechanisms are put to use in 
order to bridge this gap. Yet, there are several obstacles facing the endorsement of 
resonance as a mechanism for mindreading and intention understanding (see also Catmur 
[2015]). So, the first issue concerns the contribution of resonance mechanisms to 
mindreading (that is to conceptually understanding) an agent’s intentions, and I will now 
set it aside to focus on the question of perception.  
The second issue, to which I now turn, concerns the perceivability of goal-directedness in 
visible actions. A second claim often made on behalf of resonance mechanisms (and 
which is most relevant to this paper) is that they are necessary conditions for the 
                                               
6 Intentions can form hierarchies of complexity, ranging from future directed intentions (my intention to 
bake a cake), to present intentions (my intention to make the batter), to intentions in action or executive 




perception of goal-directed actions.7 The neuroscientific discovery of processes of 
mirroring on which this claim rests is that the same brain areas are active during the 
execution and the observation of goal-directed actions. This claim seems appealing 
because it parsimoniously restricts the representational resources necessary for the 
perception of others’ goal-directed actions to the resources necessary for the execution of 
goal-directed actions (Knoblich [2008]; Prinz [1990]).  
The claim that resonance is a necessary condition for the perception of another’s goal-
directed action seems to rest on the acceptance of an overly strong version of the motor 
theory of perception, according to which the perception of another’s goal-directed action 
just consists in motor simulation, that is in the simulation of the agent’s bodily 
movements, without executing them. On this assumption, one is able to perceive others’ 
goal-directed actions only to the extent that one is able to simulate them with one’s own 
motor system. This assumption seems to fly in the face of the evidence that we can 
perceive many goal-directed actions which we cannot motorily simulate, such as a 
snake’s crawl or a bird’s flight, or that very young infants, whose motor system is not yet 
mature, also show sensitivity to goal-directed actions they are not able to perform. 
This is demonstrated empirically in studies on infants’ comprehension of goal-directed 
actions. Skerry, Carey and Spelke ([2013]) explore how 3-month-old infants (who can’t 
                                               
7 Another alternative interpretation of the role of resonance is due to Gallagher (Gallagher [2007]), accord-
ing to whom ‘simulation’ is a person-level concept applicable to conscious phenomena, and not to the 
sub-personal, resonance, level. Therefore, mirroring cannot constitute ‘implicit’ simulation. He suggests 
instead that mirroring is part of an enactive process that contributes to the perceptual access to the inten-
tions of others. Gallagher’s position, in my view, belongs to the mechanisms issue, that is the question 
of what mirroring is a mechanism for, and the question of what the underlying mechanisms of social 
perception are. I disagree with Gallagher on the characterization of the processes involved in social per-
ception, and in particular on their enactive nature – though I must leave in-depth engagement with Gal-
lagher's important work for further research.  
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themselves reach and grasp objects) already encode actions in terms of goals and physical 
constraints. One prediction of the resonance hypothesis is that understanding of action 
goals should be limited to the ones that have been experienced in the first-person. 
Contrary to this prediction, Skerry et al. show that 3-month-olds can understand actions 
that are kinematically distinct from actions they have experienced.  
In experiments 1 to 3, infants were assigned to three categories: infants who manipulated 
objects with adhesive Velcro mittens, infants who manipulated objects with non-adhesive 
Velcro mittens, and infants who underwent no training. Afterwards, all infants were 
habituated to watching an agent wearing Velcro gloves reaching over a barrier to grasp an 
object. After habituation, the barrier was removed and infants saw either an inefficient, 
arched reach toward the object, or a straight direct reach. Infants who had training with 
Velcro mittens looked longer at the inefficient arching reach, while infants who had 
ineffective training with non-adhesive Velcro mittens and infants with no training looked 
longer at the new direct path to the object.  
According to the experimenters, this shows that infants are able to generalize their 
experience to actions at a level of abstraction that goes beyond the kinematics of actions 
they have experienced themselves.  
Resonance-based views are also incompatible with some available experimental evidence 
on non-typical development. If perceptual resonant processes underlie the understanding 
of actions, then they seem prima facie well suited to play a double role: they support both 
the understanding and the perception of actions. But these are distinct capacities. Indeed, 
resonance-based views tend to conflate two ways of apprehending actions: social 
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perception involves early detection of the social features of the world, before further 
elaboration that includes conceptualization in terms of mental states, and attribution of 
mental states to others. For example, as shown in this section, social perception 
comprises mechanisms for the distinction between goal-directed and non-goal directed 
actions within the broader class of movements8.  
Social understanding, on the other hand, includes processes involved in mindreading, the 
ability to understand others’ behavior as being caused by mental states (such as 
intentions), to interpret others’ actions via an appeal to the underlying mental states, and 
to attribute these states to them. I thus follow Catmur ([2015]), who, in a paper criticizing 
the appeal to mirroring as a route to intention understanding, highlights the importance of 
this distinction and writes that we need a working definition of the contrast between 
action perception and intention understanding in order to make empirical progress (p. 
432)9.  
For example, subjects with autism spectrum disorder have been shown to make the same 
saccades and to exhibit the same visual tracking of animated displays of geometric 
figures performing goal-directed actions as neurotypical subjects, even if they are 
                                               
8 Even if it does not entail the identification of the specific goal towards which the movement is directed. In 
this respect the perception of goal-directed actions is similar to the perception of agency in being bina-
ry: some movements are either goal-directed or not goal-directed, just as some entities are either ani-
mated or not animated.  
9 The conflation of these two aspects of social cognition is not limited to resonant theories, though. For 
example, Rutherford and Kuhlmeier write that the study of social perception includes, inter alia, the study 
of biological motion, attribution of intentionality, and recognition and interpretation of goal-directed action 
(Rutherford and Kuhlmeier [2013], p. 3). It seems thus that the difference between social perception and 
social understanding is about the subject matter (intentional actions vs. beliefs and desires) and not mainly 




impaired in the attribution of intentions, thus showing a disconnection between 
perception and judgment (Rutherford, Pennington, and Rogers [2006]). It could be that 
their perceptual abilities involved in the perception of goal-directed actions are intact, 
even in the absence of a spontaneous judgment and attribution of intentionality to the 
displays. The ability to perceive others' goal-directed actions need not rest on the ability 
to execute or simulate them.  
3. WHAT ARE THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION (WITHOUT 
RESONANCE)?  
 
Further evidence for the necessity of distinguishing social perception and social 
understanding comes from the available body of neuropsychological evidence. This 
evidence supports the proposal that goal-directed actions are perceived either before 
resonance takes place or in the absence of resonance.  
Such a claim rests on the exploration of the neural basis of the perception of goal-directed 
actions: the areas that plausibly contribute to the perception of goal-directed actions are 
non-resonant. This special role of the STS for perception is noted in the philosophical 
literature (Spaulding [2013]), but it has not been thoroughly discussed by philosophers. 
Empirical research emphasizes the central role of the STS for the social perception of 
goal-directed action (Hein and Knight [2008]; Jellema and Perrett [2007]; Molenberghs, 
Brander, Mattingley, and Cunnington [2010]; Zilbovicius et al. [2006]; Frith and Frith 
[2003]; Gallagher and Firth [2003]; Watson et al. [2014], Deen et al. [2015]). The right 
posterior area of the STS is sensitive to the relation between an observed motion and the 
environmental constraints on the motion (Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, and Kanwisher 
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[2004]). The STS in both humans and monkeys activates for biological movements (both 
goal-directed actions, such as grasping, and actions directed to other conspecifics, such as 
lip- smacking), but also for static images of faces and bodies (Allison et al. [2000]). It 
also activates for animated motion even if the agent is a geometrical entity (Gao, Scholl, 
and McCarthy [2012]). Some cells in the lower bank of the STS respond to bodily 
movements directed at objects or locations (Perrett et al. [1989]). It thus seems that the 
STS plays a central role in perception of goal-directed movements, alongside with the 
perception of other social properties.   
Importantly, the STS does not contain mirror neurons, that is neurons active in both the 
execution and the perception of actions. It only contains cells that respond to the 
perception of actions executed by agents (both conspecific and non-biological agents). In 
non-human primates, the STS sends reciprocal projections to the inferior parietal cortex 
(PF), which is in turn reciprocally connected to the premotor cortex area F5, where mirror 
neurons were first discovered. However, there are no direct connections between areas F5 
and the STS (Jellema and Perrett, 2007; Keysers and Perrett [2004]). So, whatever role 
mirroring plays in social perception, in and of itself, the STS cannot underlie resonance. 
But it nonetheless plays a prominent role in the perception of goal-directed actions, and 
more broadly social perception. This evidence provides additional support for the claim 
that resonance is not necessary for perceiving goal-directed actions.  
A paper by Deen et al. ([2015]) explores the functional organization of the STS in more 
detail. While the STS activates both for people reading stories that involve mental states 
(task of mentalizing), and for people seeing goal-directed actions, the study found that 
there is no overlap between responses to theory of mind tasks and observation of 
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biological motion: response to biological motion was anterior to the response to theory of 
mind tasks (which activated the temporo-parietal junction). This further speaks against 
the conflation of social perception and understanding. 
Still, as the authors of the study themselves remark, one of the main difficulties is to map 
representations into the processes underlying them (perceptual or cognitive). They write 
that ‘another general limitation of this study is that while we would like to identify 
regions of the STS that are involved in specific cognitive and perceptual processes, we 
instead use the proxy of identifying regions of the STS that respond in a given task 
contrast, as in any fMRI study’ (Deen et al. [2015]).  
Three issues might undermine the appeal to the STS as playing a central role of the 
perception of goal-directed actions: these issues stem from the fact that the STS is a high-
level perceptual area and therefore ill-suited to distinguish between what counts as 
perceptual and what counts as post-perceptual. These issues, however, can be solved.  
A first worry concerning the STS is that this brain area seems to become active in so 
many situations that it has been called ‘the chameleon of the human brain’ (Hein and 
Knight [2008]).  
Apart from the role in some mentalizing tasks, the various activations of the STS can be 
grouped in two broad families: one concerned with social perception (including 
perception of goal-directed actions, biological motion, faces and expressions) and another 
concerned with the integration of different sensory modalities. STS is thus not a primary 
visual area, but one that underlies (comparatively) higher-level visual processing.  
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Cross-modal integration, however, is not yet post-perceptual processing, or conceptual 
thought. Thus, the fact that an area is involved in cross-modal integration does not show 
that the area is dedicated to post-perceptual processing, unless one simply assumes 
without any argument that cross-modal integration cannot occur within perceptual 
processing. This assumption, however, would be inconsistent with the increasingly 
widespread evidence that perception is intrinsically multi- and cross-modal (Calvert, 
Spence and Stein [2004]). In fact, binding several features of an object is typical of 
perceptual processing. It is uncontroversial that the visual system can bind several 
attributes (for example its size, shape, color, orientation and motion) of an object (for 
example a dog) into a single visual percept. It further seems uncontroversial that binding 
is also what underlies the creation of a cross-modal percept by integrating the visual 
representation of a dog and either the auditory experience of the barking of the dog or the 
tactile experience of touching its fur. So, while future research on the role of the STS is 
undoubtedly necessary for better understanding how multi-modal integration underlies 
social perception, there is little reason to worry so far about the perceptual status of 
representation in STS. 
Further supporting the claim that the representation of action in STS is perceptual, there 
is a clear difference between perceiving a goal-directed action performed by a human 
agent (for example locomotion), even if doing so indeed requires binding, and thinking 
about it or even imagining it. The STS is active when one perceives a goal-directed action 
executed by another, but it is not active when one imagines another’s goal-directed 
action. It is active, however, when someone reads stories involving mentalizing. But, as 
we already saw, there is no functional overlap between these activations (Deen et al. 
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[2015]). While I am not using this point to conclusively demonstrate that we perceive 
goal-directed actions, it does lend some support to my claim that activity of the STS is 
associated with high-level social perception.  
A second worry is that what findings of experiments on the STS really show is that the 
STS is selectively activated for biological movements. If so, this would be consistent 
with the view that what is being encoded by the output of the activity of the STS is not 
the representation of goal-directed actions per se, but instead the kinematic features of an 
agent’s movements in relation to her environment, provided that the agent is a biological 
agent. In other words, the STS would be selectively activated by the processing of 
movements which obey the same biological constraints as the movements that humans 
and animals can perform. But it would only encode the low-level kinematic features of 
these biological movements, not the high-level property of actions of being goal-directed. 
To answer this worry, I appeal to the evidence that the STS does not only respond when 
subjects see goal-directed actions performed by biological agents, but also when they see 
goal-directed actions performed by non-biological agents, such as geometrical shapes, 
which execute motions which do not satisfy the constraints of biological movements 
(Gao, Scholl, and McCarthy [2012]). Gao, Scholl and McCarthy's study explores the 
neural correlates of the perception of animacy and goal-directed actions (which in the 
study is described, somewhat misleadingly, as ‘intentionality’) in the right posterior STS, 
or pSTS. The experimental design consists in manipulating perceptual cues for goal-
directed actions, while maintaining constant perceptual cues for animacy. Practically, this 
is done with a ‘wolf chasing sheep’ display, in which a colored disk (the wolf) chases one 
of the other two colored disks (the sheep and the ‘bystander’). Different conditions were 
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tested: a) non-goal directed displays with patterns of motions where only low-level non-
social motion properties were present; b) displays where the ‘wolf’ would not change 
goals but chase one target consistently; c) displays where the ‘wolf’ would change its 
target. The Changing Intentions condition gave rise to stronger activation in the right 
pSTS (posterior STS) and adjacent right LOTC (lateral occipitotemporal cortex) than did 
the other conditions (Gao, Scholl, and McCarthy [2012]).  
Statistically speaking, we more frequently see goal-directed actions executed by 
biological agents, whose movements are in accordance with the constraints of biological 
motions, than goal-directed actions performed by non-biological agents. Nevertheless, 
activity of the STS can be triggered by the detection of goal-directed actions performed 
by non-biological agents. This tells against the claim that STS only responds to low-level 
kinematic features, and supports the view that it enables us to perceive goal-directedness.  
A third issue is that someone could claim that the perception of low-level sensory 
features was sufficient for prompting activations of the STS. This claim, however, is in 
contrast with the known patterns of activations of this area: the STS activates for 
biological motions, goal-directed actions, emotional expressions, voices, but not for 
random non goal-directed motions, colors, orientations, ... For instance, in the Changing 
Intentions condition, right pSTS showed strong selective activation in the goal-directed 
condition, but not in the condition where subjects observed only random non-goal 
directed motion (Gao, Scholl, and McCarthy [2012]).10 The effect just ‘pops out’ in 
                                               
10  The authors write ‘[o]n the basis of these results […] we conclude that the right pSTS is engaged 
in social perception, as distinct from other non-social factors. This same lesson has been drawn from many 
other studies, but it has been challenging to support such claims given that the relevant social vs. nonsocial 




At this point, one might be tempted to object that this is all well and good, but since 
geometrical figures do not really have goals, this undermines my thesis: We cannot 
possibly see goals.  I offer the following two-tiered rejoinder to this conceptual objection.  
First, we need to be clear what ‘goal’ means. As I indicated in section 1, ‘goal’ in this 
context should not be construed as an internal mental representation, but instead as the 
external outcome of a movement. Once again, my thesis is not aimed at establishing that 
we perceive goal-directed actions, when goal means a private mental state. I use goal in 
the sense of a publicly available outcome of a movement, where the outcome is an event. 
One reason this distinction is important, as I also pointed out earlier in the discussion of 
the putative role of resonance, is that we should be careful to distinguish between 
different scopes of social perception. The stronger version proposes that we perceive 
mental states as such (intentions qua mental states, or goals as internal and not external 
goals). According to the more moderate version that I wish to defend, what can be 
represented in perception is not limited to the processing of low-level sensory features 
(such as the kinematic properties discussed above).  
Second, it is necessary to clarify what ‘sees’ means. Many philosophers employ the term 
in a factive sense: One can only see what actually exists or is the case. If ‘sees’ is read as 
factive, then – for instance – the claim that we see goal-directed actions in Heider and 
Simmel displays would be false. I have no qualms with those who wish to use ‘sees’ as a 
                                                                                                                                            
present study is especially compelling, as our use of the chasing displays allowed us to rule out these 
competing factors, varying social information while holding nearly every lower-level property constant.’ 
(Gao, Scholl, and McCarthy [2012]). 
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success term. But there is a perfectly good, interesting sense in which we do see goal-
directed actions in the relevant sorts of displays. Perceptual displays serve as proxies for 
the spontaneous formation of (sometimes illusory) perceptual judgements, and allow for 
fast shortcuts for navigating the social world. For example, imagine being transported to 
Flatland, where squares and spheres do have mental states. Perception, as a psychological 
process, treats as goal-directed actions all movements toward objects when certain cues 
are present. When we reflect, we may think otherwise. This relates to the also commonly 
accepted view that, actually, not all perception is factive: seeing an x as an F does not 
imply that the x is an F (Dretske [2000]).  
4. FROM NEURAL CORRELATES TO THE EXPERIENCE OF GOAL-DIRECTED 
ACTIONS  
 
At this point, a philosopher interested in the contents of perceptual experience could 
object that the neuropsychological evidence presented in the previous section, while 
interesting, does not really bear very directly on the question of what a person can see (as 
opposed to cognize), because none of the evidence is at the personal level. Does the data 
about processing really tell us anything about the subject's phenomenal experience? 
While many studies discussed above do not directly tap into the subjects' phenomenal 
experiences, there is empirical evidence that the perception of goal-directed action gives 
rise to a strong phenomenal experience as opposed to actions that are not goal-directed. 
For instance, in Gao et al.’s studies, activation in the STS was highest in the goal-directed 
condition, but not in other conditions.  
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The presence of a goal-directed action (that is the presence of ‘chasers’) influenced the 
subjects’ performance, even when the goal-directed stimulus was irrelevant to the task 
(Gao, McCarthy and Scholl [2010]). In another paper, the same authors explore the 
presence of another cue of goal-directedness action, which they call the ‘wolfpack 
effect’: when a randomly moving set of geometrical figures persistently keep on pointing 
to the same moving disc as if they were chasing it (Gao, McCarthy and Scholl [2010]).  
But independently of such empirical evidence, why suppose that we perceive goal-
directed actions in the first place? I think it is worth making a fairly intuitive experience-
based case for such a claim. The striking fact that we may experience the illusion of 
intentionality in the presence of a goal-directed action performed by a non-biological 
agent without intentions is strong evidence that our visual experience of goal-directed 
action is indeed perceptual. Take the case of the famous animated displays of Heider and 
Simmel: geometrical stimuli are seen as chasing each other and the viewers have an 
irresistible drive to describe the displays in mentalistic terms (Heider and Simmel 
[1944]). We reflectively know that geometrical figures cannot truly have goals. They do 
not possess the kind of structure folk think can bear mental states – they do not have a 
brain. Yet we cannot stop ourselves from automatically ascribing mental states to them 
and having the impression of mentalistic goal-driven entities despite our best efforts. 
Here is a speculation about what happens in these cases: we see goal-directed actions 
and, on the basis of our perceptual experience, we immediately and non-reflectively 
formulate the perceptual judgement that the entity has an intention or mentalistic goal. 
This judgment is based on a perceptual experience, and so can – and typically will – soon 
conflict with our reflective judgment that geometrical stimuli can’t have goals. The 
 
24 
hypothesis that these are instances of perception is an initially plausible one. If it is 
further supported by independent empirical evidence, then we should adopt it – absent 
powerful arguments for competing views. 
Such considerations do, in my opinion, help make the case that we (and not just some 
inaccessible regions of our brain) perceptually represent goal-directed actions. Yet I grant 
that the question of whether the evidence about the neural substrates correlate with a 
perceptual experience of goal-directed actions remains difficult to answer. It hinges on 
the notorious issue of the connection between the neural and experiential levels. While 
my aim is not to provide an ultimate reply to this issue, I want to speculatively suggest, to 
conclude this section, that there is an indirect way to explore a positive answer, which 
will need more testing and confirmation, but is an initial step in the right direction.  
The indirect way goes through the investigation of perceptual adaptation to goal-direct 
actions involving lifting of, and placing, of heavy and light objects (Barraclough, Keith, 
Xiao, Oram, and Perrett [2009]). Adaptation studies are used to manipulate subjects' 
perceptual experiences. For example, after adaptation to a grating with lines tilted toward 
the left, the subject experiences a subsequent grating with vertical lines as if the lines 
were tilted toward the right. Adaptation therefore provides some guidance to the contents 
of perceptual experiences (Gibson and Radner [1937]; for discussion see Block [2014]). 
In the experiment on placing and lifting actions, a human hand grasped a block and lifted 
it. The test involved two kinds of actions: grasping and placing. Subjects passively 
observed the action and their impressions of lightness or heaviness were manipulated by 
the ratio of the reach and withdraw phases. When the reach phase was longer than the 
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withdraw phase, subjects consistently perceived the object as lighter. When the withdraw 
phase was longer than the reach phase, subjects consistently perceived the object as 
heavier. The subjects first adapted to either a light or a heavy object action, and then they 
watched an action involving an intermediate weight action. They responded by using a 
rating scale from 100gr to 900gr to indicate the perceived weight of the object. 
Adaptation propagated across kinds of actions (adapting to the perception of grasping 
objects had an influence on the perception of placing objects). Subjects, who visually 
adapted to actions involving a heavy object, saw the subsequent actions as involving 
lighter objects, and vice versa (Barraclough et al. [2009]).  
Two conditions were tested: for the same kind of actions (placing-to-placing) and for 
different kinds of actions (placing-to-grasping). In placing-to-placing, after adapting to a 
hand placing a heavy object, subjects experienced the subsequent placing display as 
involving a lighter object. In placing-to-grasping, after adapting to a placing action, 
subjects saw a subsequent grasping action as involving heavier objects than the object 
they had adapted to.   
One worry is that experiments on perceptual adaptation alone cannot establish that goal-
directed actions are perceived, because the subjects' reports are based on judgments of the 
relative weights of the objects involved. But the judgment might not faithfully mirror the 
perceptual content of the experience. In order to answer to this worry, the authors also 
performed single-cell recordings in the monkey’s STS during observation of goal-
directed movements and found that cell responses were sensitive to the presentation of 
the action and the presence of the object. Thus, the object is an integral part of the goal-
directed action whose perception cannot be reduced to the perception of a spatiotemporal 
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trajectory alone. Still, one cannot conclude that the same arises for the human subjects as 
well. 
Someone else could use the same evidence to claim the opposite and say that the content 
of perceptual experiences is actually finer-grained than just being a goal-directed action. 
The reason is that the experiment is not about the perception of goal-directed actions per 
se, but it is instead about the visual experience of the heaviness and lightness of objects 
as part of the perception of a goal-directed action. Therefore, the perceptual content in 
this case is more fine-grained than the representation of being a goal-directed action. 
It is plausible, however, that in order to perceive an action as involving lighter or heavier 
objects one has to experience goal-directed actions, and not simple movements. Indeed, it 
would seem incoherent to assume that one represents the property of an action to involve 
lighter or heavier objects, while merely representing the kinematic properties of the 
agent's movements and not its goal-directedness. Moreover, this option is still a case of 
the rich perceptual content view, and opens up another possibility for the relation 
between resonance and perception of goal-directedness that I will explore in the 
following section.   
 
5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERCEPTION OF GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIONS: 
A POSSIBLE NEW ROLE FOR RESONANCE  
 
In this section, I further explore the relation between the perception of goal-directed 
actions, resonance, and phenomenal experience. Rather than criticize extant resonance-
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based views, however, I make a suggestion about the connection between the two 
phenomena. This suggestion fits with the hypothesis that mirroring underlies associated 
learning for the understanding of actions performed by others (this hypothesis has been 
suggested by Calvo-Merino et al. [2005] and Press [2011]). I extend this proposal to 
hypothesize that mirroring might also play a role in fine-tuning our perceptual 
experiences of others' movements involved in goal-directed actions. To buttress this 
proposal, I will rely on two intriguing empirical results: one in infant perception research 
and another in the investigation of perceptual experiences of aplasic patients (patients 
born without arms).  
The first experiment is an exploration of the perception of goal-directed behavior in 
infants (6- to 8- months old) (Southgate, Johnson, and Csibra [2008]). Infants observed a 
display where three walls (functioning as obstacles) and a ball in front of one of the walls 
were present. They were first familiarized with a normal efficient goal-directed action, 
whereby a hand removed an obstacle before reaching for a ball. After familiarization, two 
conditions were tested. In the first condition, infants observed the hand remove the 
obstacles before reaching for the ball via a biologically plausible motion. In the second 
condition, instead of removing the obstacle, the arm to which the hand was attached 
undulated (in a snake-like fashion) in a biologically implausible manner to reach the ball 
despite the obstacles. Infants looked longer in the first condition than in the second. The 
results show that infants were more surprised11 (where surprise was measured by longer 
looking times) to see the hand perform a biologically plausible but less efficient goal-
                                               
11   Longer looking time is considered to express attention and hence surprise in pre-
verbal infants. Surprise indicates a discrepancy between the expected result and the wit-
nessed result (Aslin [2007]). 
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directed action than a more efficient but biologically implausible goal-directed action 
(inconsistent with biomechanical principles). In these displays, motor similarity between 
the infants’ motor repertoire and the observed action did not constrain infants’ 
perception. Infants were not surprised to see biologically impossible motions, such as a 
hand ‘undulating’ like a snake when avoiding obstacles to grab an object. The authors 
interpret this result as evidence against the view that action understanding is rooted in 
resonance and motor experience. 
Why are infants in Southgate et al.’s experiments not surprised by violations of biological 
motion, while adults are? There is evidence that infants use the presence of a hand to 
detect the presence of a human agent (Woodward et al. [2003]), so the question is 
whether infants know ‘how hands work’. If they represent the hand as the presence of a 
human agent, it might be that at this early age (at 6 to 8 months old), infants’ motor 
repertoire is not sufficiently developed to allow for the simulation of this kind of hand 
motion. Still, they perceive goal-directed actions.  
While the mechanisms underlying the perception of goal-directed actions might be 
present early, motor expertise might develop later as infants come to be exposed to a 
greater variety of goal-directed actions specifically performed by human agents. It seems 
plausible that infants are endowed with basic mechanisms for perceiving goal-directed 
actions, even if they do not yet have a precise biological motion scheme.  
Much before human infants can successfully execute goal-directed actions such as 
locomotion, reaching for and grasping a target, early perceptual mechanisms make them 
attuned early on to the perception of a variety of goal-directed actions performed by a 
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variety of non-human agents. For example, they can see a bird fly and a snake crawl (as 
the hand in Southgate et al.’s displays). Only when they become able to execute 
biological movements which are accessible to them can they learn about the 
biomechanical constraints which sort out biological movements accessible to humans 
from biological movements only accessible to birds or snakes, and also from non-
biological movements neither accessible to humans nor to snakes and birds.  
If so, then resonance is likely to play a role in fine-tuning the perception of movements 
involved in the execution of goal-directed actions, rather than a foundational role in 
enabling the perception of goal-directed actions (see also Skerry, Carey and Spelke 
([2013]) for additional evidence on infants’ initial detection of goal-directed actions and 
the enriching role of first person motor experience).  
The ability to map another’s goal-directed action onto one’s own motor repertoire is not 
necessary for the perception of another’s action as being goal-directed. But it may 
nevertheless play a role in shaping the fine-grained perceptual experience of others' 
movements.  
A potential objection to this proposal is that Southgate et al.'s experiment might not tap 
directly into the experienced contents of perception. There is, however, a paradigm that 
explores the way in which (bodily) movements are experienced in perception: the 
apparent body motion paradigm, which shares similarities to the experiment above. In 
research on apparent body motion (Shiffrar and Freyd [1993]; Shiffrar [2008]), people 
perceive the longer, but anatomically plausible path, rather than the shortest, but 
anatomically implausible path, when seeing a hand and arm action.  
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In a typical experiment, subjects view flickering pictures or videos of an actor performing 
a movement: the movement can be perceived either as a short movement that does not 
respect biological constraints (for example a hand passing through a head) or as a longer 
movement that respects biological constraints (for example a hand rotating around the 
head). In these displays, biological plausibility constrains the perception of movements. 
Subjects consistently consciously perceived a hand wrapping around a head, rather than a 
hand passing through a head, or an arm wrapping around another arm instead of passing 
through.  
Shiffrar’s experiments were tested on aplasic subjects (subjects born without arms): one 
aplasic subject experienced the phantom limb phenomenon, the other did not. The first 
subject experienced the longer and biologically plausible path in perception, while the 
second subject experienced the shorter and biologically implausible path (Funk, Shiffrar, 
and Brugger [2005]). Both subjects know how arms usually move, even if they never had 
arms them themselves. Still, their phenomenal experiences were different, because in one 
case, there was resonance between another’s real arms and the subject’s phantom arms, 
and in the other case, there was not. So resonance and motor expertise might contribute to 
phenomenal experience through the fine-tuning of the perception of an agent’s biological 
movements during the observation of her goal-directed actions.  
To sum up, some experimental evidence points toward the idea that resonance does 
indeed play a role in the perception of goal-directed actions. It makes the content of the 
initial set of perceptual representations finer-grained, as the evidence of a contrast 
between the perceptual representations with and without resonance in aplasic subjects 
shows. This suggests a new role for resonance -- one that has been mostly overlooked in 
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the literature on the perception of others' actions by authors who claim that resonance is 
necessary for perceiving others' goal-directed actions. While resonance is not necessary 
for perceiving goal-directed actions, it may nonetheless contribute significantly to the 
perception of others' movements in the execution of goal-directed actions. Investigating 
this proposal is a promising avenue for further research. 
6. CONCLUSION: SEEING GOAL-DIRECTEDNESS OF ACTIONS AND SOCIAL 
PERCEPTION 
 
Let us take stock. I have considered cognitive neuroscientific evidence for the view that 
the goal-directedness of others’ actions can be represented in perception. I have 
considered and rejected the appeal to motor resonance as a necessary condition for the 
perception of goal-directed actions as such. I have further argued that the 
neurophysiological evidence strongly suggests that the STS plays a central role in the 
perception of goal-directed actions. These two views are closely related, since the STS 
does not contain mirror neurons, that is cells that underlie resonance because they fire 
both during the execution and the perception of goal-directed actions. The available 
empirical evidence also shows that the STS sends information to areas containing mirror 
neurons, but does not receive information from them. I proposed a hypothesis which 
accounts for all this data: Resonance may contribute to the further elaboration of the 
information processed by the STS. Further evidence from studies on perceptual 
adaptation and on the experiential and behavioral differentiation between non-goal-
directed and goal-directed motions shows that activations of the STS is correlated with 
the phenomenal experience associated with the perception of goal-directed actions.  
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The picture that emerges is one in which a distinction is drawn between social perception 
and social understanding. Distinguishing mechanisms and processes underlying 
perception from those underlying understanding, however, does not necessarily create an 
insurmountable gap between the two. Understanding another’s goal-directed action may 
require mapping her action onto one’s own ability to act. Further research is needed to 
explore the rich connections between social perception and social understanding at the 
fully conceptual level. The hypothesis concerning the perception of goal-directed actions 
presented in this paper is but a first step in describing and outlining a distinctive and 
overlooked aspect of human visual perception and social cognition, social perception, the 
ability to visually detect and track properties related to other animated beings (human and 
non-human).  
Future research on social perception will shed more light on this distinctive feature of 
social cognition. There are at least four possible avenues worth exploring. The first issue 
concerns the reach of social perception: which social properties can be represented in 
perception? While in this paper I have made a case for the perception of goal-directed 
actions, there are other potential candidates: for example, animacy and being a living 
being (as opposed to being an inanimate object or an artifact), emotional expressions (and 
in particular expressions for the six basic emotions), age, gender, social relations (being 
dominant or subordinate). In order to explore this issue, we might need to appeal to a 
variety of empirical means: from studies on the neural correlates of high-level perception 
to perceptual adaptation studies, from studies on the timecourse of social perception to 
studies on non-typical development and impairments. The exploration of the reach of 
social perception is connected with the question of the ontology of mental states, and in 
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particular with the issue of whether mental states are embodied in their behavioral 
manifestations.12 While I set aside the ontology of mental states in this paper, I agree with 
direct social perception approaches that it is ultimately central for understanding the 
power of social perception (Krueger [2012]). If the embodiment hypothesis is correct 
then social perception might indeed extend to mental states and others’ emotional states 
or intentional actions beyond their behaviors. Given the highly controversial status of the 
embodiment hypothesis, I prefer to remain neutral on this issue here. 
The second issue concerns the function of social perception in social cognition. One 
particularly interesting question is the connection between social perception and action: is 
there a direct route from social perception to action that bypasses understanding? For 
example, by seeing someone’s emotional expression we could formulate an immediate, 
automatic reaction, even if we haven’t yet conceptualized the emotional expression (such 
as a defense reaction when seeing fear or anger). There is some evidence on automatic 
motor preparation in the case of emotional expressions of fear (Borgomaneri, Gazzola, 
and Avenanti [2012]). Similar studies could be done for goal-directed actions.  
The third concerns the relation between social perception and social understanding 
(which includes mindreading). Whether social perception can support some forms of 
social understanding, as direct perception and resonance theory claim, is still up for 
grabs. One hypothesis is that the function of social perception is just to provide contents 
for further processing in higher cognition for mindreading and understanding, and to 
connect experience with fast and automatic reactions. Another hypothesis is that social 
perception also has a role in the understanding of social properties and of mental states. 
                                               
12 I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the question of embodiment.  
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Further evidence and arguments are needed to decide between these two options.  
A final area for future research concerns psychopathological disorders.13 Some impair-
ments within the social domain might be due to impairments in mindreading, others 
might be due to impairments in social perception (for example the inability to see actions 
as goal directed) – and some might be due to impairments of both sorts. Thus, an alterna-
tive to the interpretation of autism spectrum disorders briefly sketched above (p. 14) is 
that some troubles in understanding others’ intentions might be due to impairments to 
perceptual level processing of actions, as opposed to high-level cognitive understanding 
in theory of mind (see Gallese and Rochat [2018]).  Further work on impairments of so-
cial perception should shed lights on these issues.  
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